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British corporate networks, 1976-
2010: extending the study of finance-
industry relationships.   
Using an extensive and unique dataset that has been created to record the composition of the 
boards of directors of the Top 250 British firms between 1904 and 2010, this article builds upon 
a previous study on the corporate network to 1976 by extending the study to 2010.  The analysis 
revolves around three key observations: the nature and depth of the corporate network; the 
distinct stages in corporate connectivity between 1976 and 2010, and the 1980s watershed in 
the relationship between financial and other sectors. The article will conclude with an analysis 
of how the dataset has changed our perceptions of British corporate networks and a discussion 
of implications for future research. 
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Introduction 
 
While an extensive literature analysing the relationship between British financial 
institutions and the rest of British business has been generated, it is apparent from a detailed 
and long-term investigation of the corporate network that aspects relating to inter-
organisational relationships and wider patterns associated with the financialisation of British 
business need to be further examined. The authors recently revisited patterns of corporate 
connectivity in Britain from the beginning of the twentieth century to 1976,1 illustrating the 
continuing shifts in British business and the dramatic changes experienced in the financial 
sector. The motivation behind this article is to extend the study to 2010 in order to gain 
further insights into patterns of corporate connectivity, thereby revealing previously 
unrecorded changes in British corporate networks, particularly a change in the nature of 
outside directors of public companies. Scott and Griff, who conducted a study of the British 
corporate network up to the 1980s, concluded that British business was dominated by 
financial interests,2 given both the latter’s extensive representation on boards of directors and 
recent changes in ownership structures. More recently, Froud et. al. repeat this overarching 
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claim, noting that British corporate strategy had come to be dominated by “financialization”, 
namely, the primacy of maximising shareholder value in order to limit the risk of exit by the 
financial institutions that have come to own the bulk of the equity in British business.3 Of 
course, dramatic shifts in British business are nothing new, in that Hannah’s seminal work 
highlights cycles of corporate activity that transformed the British business landscape over the 
course of the twentieth century.4 Nevertheless, the work of Hannah, Toms et al., and most 
recently our own, pinpoint a distinct gap in our understanding of board interlocks in UK 
public companies.5  
Examining macro-trends in inter-organisational relationships across industries and 
decades allows one to identify specific patterns related to corporate connectivity, such as the 
presence of intra- and inter-industry links, changing centrality in various sectors over time 
and the connectivity of financial institutions. It is also important to add that at no stage do we 
assume director connections between firms represent (inter)organisational power and 
influence.6  An established literature on networks in business history as well as corporate 
networks in particular demonstrates that links between firms formed by inter-personal 
relationships are significant, even if the data does not explicitly reveal the intricacies of such 
relationships.7 The presence of a non-executive director, chairman, chief executive officer, 
etc. active on multiple company boards acts as a conduit between firms through which 
resources pass, whether they be tangible or intangible. While the authors acknowledge the 
alternate view that perhaps these relationships are of little significance, the extensive 
literature on networks finds that the existence of a relationship at all will have some impact in 
relation to the boards on which they serve.8 Using a consolidated methodology tool which is 
now part of this quickly developing literature on the corporate network of interlocking 
directors, the article covers these issues, providing key insights into inter-organizational 
relationships, particularly those between financial institutions and industrial companies, and 
assessing the role of a vast range of financial players in British business. Illuminating distinct 
patterns within British corporate connectivity and the position of financial institutions in the 
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network as a whole offers a unique perspective into the impact of continually changing 
policies and codes of practice that govern boards of directors, increasing involvement of 
foreign companies and adaptations in the role of financial institutions in British business. 
Alongside examining the position of commercial banks in the network, we also give deserved 
attention to the position and connectivity of other financial institutions, such as insurance and 
pension funds, merchant banks, trusts and similar players. This wider perspective reveals 
numerous pathways for further research that could have significant implications for assessing 
the effectiveness of the British regulatory environment, inter-organisational responses to 
crises and the impact of increasing global financial connectivity. 
In generating fresh insights into the dynamics at play within British business, an 
extensive and unique dataset has been created to record the composition of the boards of 
directors of the Top 250 British firms (according to net assets) between 1976 and 2010. We 
have chosen to begin our examination in 1976, a post-crisis period which ushered in a new 
era, signifying a distinct change in the nature of Britain’s financial system and corporate 
activity in general.9 Additionally, although inter-war industry reports focused on the role of 
banks in British industry, by the 1970s financial institutions other than commercial banks 
(such as insurance companies, pension and investment funds, merchant banks, etc.) played a 
much greater role in industry. Our focus will be on these financial institutions and their 
position in the corporate network, demonstrating the extent to which boards were connected 
at different points over the last half-century.10 
The analysis provides the basis for three key observations that offer a fresh view of 
the relationship between the boards of Britain’s major corporations. Firstly, we observe from 
our data a general move across British business from a well-integrated, dense corporate 
network to one that is far more dispersed. This is consistent with existing empirical evidence 
that associates this dispersion with a lack of shareholder engagement in the management of 
their portfolio companies, a trend that remains unchanged when international investors 
became the dominant owners of UK equities (see Figure 1).11 Secondly, the data reveals 
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distinct stages in corporate connectivity between 1976 and 2010 (pre-Cadbury, post-Cadbury, 
and post-2008 crisis). Interestingly, we also note that these stages are accompanied by 
significant shifts in the patterns of ownership of major British businesses, changing 
regulations that governed board activity, and the growing complexity of transactions, 
resulting from an influx of a plethora of financial intermediaries. Thirdly, one can identify a 
watershed in the relationship between the financial and industrial sectors in the 1980s, at 
which point financial institutions started to withdraw from the UK corporate network as a 
result of the pursuit of global strategies and a preference for highly speculative, short-term 
financial trading.12 
Starting with a brief synopsis of the various literatures analysing these trends, our 
paper will move on to explain the methods and data employed in pursuing this research 
project, focusing our attention primarily on the depth and nature of the intercorporate 
networks that existed from the 1970s into the early twenty-first century. This will provide the 
basis for an original analysis of the relationship between and within sectors, contributing 
extensively to important debates on the evolution of corporate governance and cycles of 
corporate connectivity in Britain over this fifty-year period.13 The article will conclude with 
an analysis of how the dataset has changed our perceptions of British corporate networks, 
feeding directly into policy debates and recent work by the Bank of England on the 
interconnectedness of British financial institutions.14  
 
 Literature Review: UK corporate boards and Board Interlocks 
 
Studies of British business and corporate relations over the past century have focused 
on varied themes, the most prevalent of which have been the role of British banks in the wider 
business landscape and Britain’s industrial decline.15 Discussion and analysis of the 
relationship between companies, particularly financial institutions, continues to prevail. 
Garnett, Mollan and Bentley demonstrate the illuminating patterns that can be deciphered 
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from examining relationships between banks over long periods, designating them as a ‘system 
of discreet, interacting agents’.16 Similarly, in their investigation of private equity in the UK, 
Toms and Wright stress the importance of examining inter-organisational relationships (both 
inter- and intra-sectorally) through comparative periodisations, thereby drawing broader 
conclusions regarding corporate activity in the private equity sector.17 Turner also takes this 
long-run view of understanding banking and crises as cyclical and inter-related,18 while our 
own research on corporate networks from 1904-1976, as well as this study of the later period, 
contribute to these long-run examinations by highlighting significant trends in British 
corporate connectivity over a century.19   These connections between companies, specifically 
at board level, offer a particularly unique perspective to studying interorganisational 
relationships over time.  
Other scholars have emphasised the importance of these board level connections. 
Examining financial syndicates, Bowden’s work on the crisis at Rolls-Royce identified the 
importance of intra-sectoral ties in finance in assisting endangered corporations.20 Similarly, 
Toms and Wright examine the importance of syndicates in domestic industry and the market 
for corporate control, which had considerable implications for board level relationships.21 It 
should be noted that in this paper we do not assume that director connections between firms 
represent (inter)organisational power and influence. There is an established literature on 
organisational power and influence in the field of organisational behaviour, which suggests 
that power can be characterised as the capacity or ability to affect outcomes.22 McNulty and 
Pettigrew suggest that power involves the ability to produce intended effects in line with 
one’s perceived interests’.23 Significantly for this paper, it is important to stress Pettigrew and 
McNulty’s argument that possession of power sources is only a route to potential power, and 
that the ability to use power or to produce intended effects in line with one’s perceived 
interests depends on the context, will and the skills of the individuals. This theorisation allows 
us to assume that director interlocks are suggestive of power and influence potential, rather 
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than the actual influence, measurement of which extends well beyond the scope of this 
paper.24  
One significant factor that has shaped not only the corporate network but also the 
general nature of British business in recent decades is the continual shifting patterns of 
ownership of British firms.  It is apparent that over the twentieth century the nature of 
institutional ownership in particular changed from dispersed and passive to re-concentrated, 
yet still passive. In separate articles, Davis and Jackson have claimed that a lengthening of the 
investment chain and increasing number of financial intermediaries involved in corporate 
ownership resulted in a transition from “Managerial Capitalism” to an era of “New Financial 
Capitalism”, namely, a system characterised by a re-concentration of corporate ownership in 
the hands of large investment fund managers, the bulk of whose activity was based on the 
pursuit of short-term investment strategies.25 By the early twenty-first century, UK 
institutional investors’ portfolio turnover had reached 56%,26 while the average holding 
periods of shares has fallen from six years in the 1960s to less than six months by 2015.27 
Crucially, there is extensive empirical evidence of investor disengagement, inefficient 
monitoring and lack of influence over corporate management.28 Indeed, such is the near 
universal disengagement of institutional fund managers that in the early twenty-first century 
senior management would appear to be potentially as free to determine corporate strategy as 
in the 1930s, the decade described by Hannah as “the golden age of directorial power”.29  
In recent years, while a large percentage of UK ownership has been transferred into 
the hands of foreign investors, this has increased the distance between the board and 
shareholders, allowing for shareholder passivity to continue.30 Figure 1 demonstrates how the 
proportion of shares traded on the London Stock Exchange held by private investors fell 
dramatically from the early-1960s, reaching just eleven per cent by 2012, while over the same 
period institutional investors such as mutual funds, insurance companies and pension funds 
came to dominate. Although one can explain this trend by noting that individuals increasingly 
preferred to invest their wealth through institutions, as we shall go on to explain the nature of 
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institutional ownership portrayed the same passive characteristics as the private investors of 
the nineteenth century portrayed by Acheson et al.31 The growth in foreign ownership of UK 
listed equities (‘Rest of World’ in Figure 1) remains primarily institutional in nature, 
including sovereign wealth funds and performance-driven hedge funds.32 These crucial 
changes in corporate activity, ownership and governance in the last fifty years have had 
significant implications for the network of interlocking directorates, serving to shape the 
network in interesting ways, as will be discussed below.   
 
Figure 1: Beneficial Ownership of UK equities, 1963-2010 
 
Source: Share register survey report, Central Statistics Office (CSO), 2010. 
According to the UK Companies Act 2006, the authority to manage the affairs of the 
company is vested in its board of directors, while the board usually delegates the authority for 
day-to-day running of the company to its management33. The board has three key functions: 
management, oversight and service. The lines between these functions are fuzzy at best and 
over time there has been a shift from boards having an advisory role in the 1970s to a more 
managerial role in the 1990s, that is determining a company’s aims, policies and strategies 
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(for example, approving mergers and acquisitions), with an increasing emphasis on the 
monitoring role and director independence in the context of persisting corporate scandals and 
failures in the 2000s.34 Given these shifts, the board interlock becomes a crucial unit of 
analysis for wider trends in corporate connectivity, providing us with a novel perspective on 
trends in British business. Interlocks comprised of directors who sit on more than one 
corporate board constitute a corporate network, providing incisive insights into the nature of 
inter-organisational relationships. Interlocks often indicate the presence of a commercial 
relationship, whether personal or capital in nature, the latter being a relationship typically 
between shareholders and the company in which they invest.35  Similarly, interlocking 
directorates have been widely analysed in the context of corporate strategy, focusing 
specifically on the impact of outside directors on senior management.36  
The importance of analysing board interlocks is rooted in both the role of the board as 
decision-maker and the various roles of directors who linked multiple boards together (known 
as “linkers”). As a ‘distinctive feature of the corporate form’, boards and links between 
boards offer an insightful representation of company-to-company relationships and wider 
corporate structures.37 As the board has numerous functions, including dictating corporate 
strategy and monitoring the performance and general decision-making of management,38 this 
highlights the significance of studying board interlocks formed by these so-called “linkers”. 
While previous studies and reports have shown that interlocking directors within their varying 
positions (non-executive, independent, chairman, etc.) can have an impact on corporate 
accountability, decision-making and access to resources (in particular, information and 
external contacts), little work has been done on the way UK interlocks have evolved over 
recent decades.39  
In cases where outside directors represent shareholders’ interests, Roberts et al. 
argued that these individuals should be motivated to take up non-executive board positions, 
because in doing so this would give them direct access to corporate strategy and potentially 
allow for efficient monitoring of corporate behaviour, as well as opening a useful line of 
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communication between owners and top management.40 Given the findings of Acheson et al. 
regarding the lack of shareholder voting rights in early UK companies, it is possible that 
board interlocks (whether as non-executives or other forms of “linkers”) historically acted as 
an alternative conduit to corporate control and continue to do so in the current business 
landscape.41 At the same time, our examination of the corporate network demonstrates not 
only the transformation of corporate connectivity over numerous decades, but also the 
changing composition of board interlocks, potentially isolating boards from contacts which 
could prove useful, thereby impacting on lines of communication throughout British business. 
Crucially, arising from the analysis of the corporate network data and supplementary data, it 
is clear that the position of financial institutions in the British corporate landscape has shifted 
significantly and the network overall has experienced notable fluctuations in connectivity in 
response to various market conditions and regulatory changes. This is demonstrated by the 
decreasing connectivity of the corporate network, as we shall demonstrate below, especially 
in the case of financial institutions, which have been withdrawing from the core of the UK 
corporate network in recent decades. Additionally, following major corporate governance 
code changes and financial crises, there have also been periods of reactionary network 
reintegration.42  
Examining the corporate network of interlocking directorates as a whole can thus 
provide a unique perspective on the presence of these relationships across and within all 
sectors. Many scholars have adopted this approach for earlier decades. For example, Utton 
highlights the relationship between clearing banks and the manufacturing sector in the mid-
1970s, while Whitley demonstrates the significance of intra-sectoral ties within the financial 
sector in the same period.43  Moreover, Cosh and Hughes argued in the 1980s that “this 
recurring intimacy between relatively small numbers of giant financial and industrial 
concerns is clearly a significant feature of the contemporary anatomy of corporate control and 
must be taken into account in assessing trends in the separation of ownership and control and 
its behavioural implications”.44  
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Scott and Griff  have also shown that in the 1970s and 1980s the corporate network 
was comprised of multiple ‘groupings’ of financial and non-financial enterprises, leading 
them to conclude that the former were by far the most dominant influence on corporate 
strategy.45 Indeed, they claim that “Financial Capitalism” was the abiding characteristic of 
British business by the 1980s, given the recent transfer of ownership to institutional investors 
(see Figure 1) and an extensive network of interlocking directorates that apparently vested 
them with paramount control over the rest of British business.  
  Although the studies by Scott and Griff and others have provided valuable insights 
into corporate network structures, the role of traditional financial institutions and the 
ownership of equity stakes up to the 1980s, it is now timely to readdress the past fifty years of 
corporate and financial developments. Building on the general approaches suggested by Toms 
et al. and Garnett et al., this article provides a wider lens through which to view the evolution 
of corporate connectivity and activity in the UK from the late 1950s. Through the use of 
corporate network analysis, we can begin to draw important correlations between corporate 
connectivity, integration, dispersion and reintegration of the network, and what this might 
suggest regarding patterns of ownership, shifting corporate strategies and the role of various 
financial players in British business.   
Methodology and Dataset 
A highly effective method of assessing financial-industrial sector relationships has 
been through the use of corporate network analysis. A number of studies reveal the efficacy 
of corporate networks in isolating distinct inter-organisational patterns in business 
communities across the globe. While many of these tend to focus on the US, the Netherlands 
and Germany, scholars such as Scott and Windolf have engaged with aspects of the British 
corporate network.46 More recently, David and Westerhuis commissioned an extensive 
analysis of corporate networks across a large number of developed economies, including the 
UK, providing detailed comparative perspectives to which we will return later.47 This study of 
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the British corporate network significantly adds to the literature by exploring the British case 
up to very recent years through the use of network data and network visualisations, which are 
a useful iterative tool for uncovering both wider trends and pathways for further research. In 
particular, the article emphasises the importance of examining all financial institutions and 
their activity within the network, rather than focusing only on commercial banks.  
Examining complex inter-organisational relationships as represented by board interlocks has 
required the creation of a longitudinal dataset detailing the extent of interlocking directorates 
within the UK’s top 250 companies (fifty financial, 200 non-financial, based on net assets) for 
sample years (1976, 1983, 1993, 1997, 2000 and 2010). The years selected represent distinct 
phases within British business from the period which followed the 1973 secondary banking 
crisis and multiple policy changes with regard to the financial sector and corporations in 
general (1976 and 1983); the period after the ‘Big Bang’ of 1985 that witnessed growing 
internationalisation of British business and the first wave of corporate governance codes 
(1993); followed by a decade of continued corporate governance code reforms (1997 and 
2000); and the years following the Global Financial Crisis (2010). The data has been gathered 
from varied sources such as the Stock Exchange Year Book, Times 1000 list, Thompson One, 
annual reports, BoardEx and pre-existing datasets.48 While 250 was the target for sample size, 
data issues prevented hitting this number of companies for two benchmark years. For 
example, the 1983 sample was gathered from The Times 1000 which limited the figure for 
UK based companies to 218.49 Regardless of this smaller sample, the data offers a sufficient 
spread across sectors to provide an accurate picture of the top companies in British business 
for each of the benchmark years. With regards to the spread of the sample over sectors, Table 
1 illustrates the varied frequency of sector representation in the sample over the benchmark 
years, indicating not only the growth and decline of certain types of companies but also waves 
of sector concentration and consolidation (for example, the decrease in the number of 
commercial banks).  
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Table 1. Major sector representation in each of the benchmark years; represented in sample 
number and as percentages of total sample (based on standard industrial classification of 
economic activities)50 
 
Sector Standard 
Industria
l 
Classifica
tion (SIC) 
1976 
(No. 
in 
Samp
le) 
197
6 
(% 
of 
tot
al) 
1983 
(No. 
in 
Samp
le) 
198
3 
(% 
of 
tot
al) 
1993 
(No. 
in 
Samp
le) 
199
3 
(% 
of 
tot
al) 
1997 
(No. 
in 
Samp
le) 
199
7 
(% 
of 
tot
al) 
2000 
(No. 
in 
Samp
le) 
200
0 
(% 
of 
tot
al) 
2010 
(No. 
in 
Samp
le) 
201
0 
(% 
of 
tot
al) 
Commercial 
Banks 
60 21 8.4 15 6.8 11 4.4 13 5.2 13 5.2 5 2 
Insurance and 
Other 
Financial 
61-67 40 16 29 13.
3 
39 15.
6 
37 14.
8 
37 14.
8 
44 17.
8 
Retail and 
Wholesale 
Trade 
50-59 32 12.
8 
31 14.
2 
31 12.
4 
32 12.
8 
31 12.
4 
28 11.
3 
Transportatio
n, 
Communicatio
ns and Utilities 
40-49 13 5.2 15 6.8 43 17.
2 
38 15.
2 
43 17.
2 
33 13.
3 
Construction 15-19 9 3.6 12 5.5 11 4.4 12 4.8 18 7.2 13 5.3 
Manufacturing 
(materials) 
30-34 19 7.6 16 7.3 12 4.8 11 4.4 10 4 4 1.6 
Manufacturing 
(equipment) 
35-39 33 13.
2 
28 12.
8 
24 9.6 19 7.6 22 8.8 22 8.9 
Chemicals/Ma
terials 
22-26, 
28 
25 10 18 8.2 29 11.
6 
27 10.
8 
18 7.2 14 5.6 
Publishing 27 4 1.6 3 1.3 6 2.4 9 3.6 8 3.2 8 3.2 
Food, 
Beverage and 
Tobacco 
20-21 29 11.
6 
26 11.
9 
16 6.4 18 7.2 13 5.2 12 4.8 
Oil and Gas 13 14 5.6 7 3.2 5 2 8 3.2 6 2.4 17 6.9 
Mining 10 4 1.6 3 1.3 2 0.8 3 1.2 5 2 12 4.8 
Services 
(Business, 
Accounting, 
Hotel and 
Leisure) 
70-87 7 2.8 15 6.8 21 8.4 21 8.4 26 10.
4 
35 14.
2 
Agri/Forestry/
Fishing 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0.8 0 0 0 0 
Total 
 
250 100 218 100 250 100 250 100 250 100 247 100 
 
Using network analysis software (Pajek), we have constructed network graphs for 
each of these benchmark years, aiding the analysis of the changing structure, shape and 
density of the network.51 Measures of network integration, connectivity and dispersion have 
proved useful in a multitude of cases and contexts. Many studies have demonstrated the 
propensity of firms and individuals to form networks in order to gain resources, both tangible 
and intangible.52 The shape of a network and the connections forged and broken occur often 
as a response to changes in the environment. Indeed, examining the network of interlocking 
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directorates over decades provides an excellent tool with which to view many of the broader 
changes that occurred within the British business (and indeed, global business) environment. 
Importantly, through the use of actor centrality measures (known as the Freeman degree), it 
has allowed us to gauge which firms occupied the core and periphery of the network in each 
sample year. Discovering actor centrality through the Freeman degree, which is the sum of 
the shortest paths from a singular node, allows the ranking of firms according to their 
connectedness, the outcome of which reveals how the composition of the core of the network 
changed over time.53 For example, Table 2 demonstrates the changing presence of financial 
institutions (banks, insurance companies and other financials) and especially the dramatic 
withdrawal of such institutions since the 1980s. The value of the Freeman degree across the 
benchmark years also provides insights into the relative density of the network for each year, 
thereby determining the level of integration within the network.54 
Table 2. Financial Institutions in the top 25 most central companies. 
 
Source: corporate networks dataset. 
Other measures, such as firm marginality, isolation and network distance have also 
been examined in each of the network years. This has provided an indication of the relative 
distance between firms in the network, the number of firms that held significant intermediary 
1976 1983 1993 1997 2000 2010
Commercial Banks and
Building Societies
6 5 6 6 6 2
Insurance Companies 5 4 1 2 1 2
Other Financial Institutions 3 3 1 0 0 1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
14 
 
positions and the types of firms that occupied the periphery of the network. Crucially, for 
each year we have also isolated the links between financial institutions (all types) and the rest 
of the network. This data provides insights into the frequency of intra-sectoral and inter-
sectoral links which could indicate an owner-investee company or advisor/advisee 
relationship, the potential presence of financial syndicates or cartel-like behaviour, inter-
sectoral alliances, and, importantly, how intra- and inter-sectoral relationships shifted over 
time in response to the changing nature of business in general.  Although the analysis of the 
corporate network enables us to determine the connectedness of particular firms and the 
overall structure of the directorate network, used in connection with ownership data (see 
Figure 1) we can draw important correlations between degree of ownership and firm 
centrality for a given year. This provides crucial insights into shareholder-board interlocks, 
allowing us to formulate conclusions regarding the level of engagement between the two as 
patterns of ownership shifted over the period.  We can also draw conclusions regarding the 
impact of overseas investment activity, impact of policy implementation such as the Cadbury 
Report and network responses to crises, all of which add to our understanding of the various 
transformations undertaken by the wider British business community in the last half century. 
Characteristics of the British Corporate Network 
This transformative period for the British corporate network has allowed for the identification 
of particular trends that are highlighted by the network visualisations described below, as well 
as network indicators which demonstrate changes in density, centrality and dispersion across 
the network for all of our benchmark years. These factors provide interesting insights that 
serve to support the results proposed, specifically that the density of the network changed 
considerably after 1980. Additionally, this decade in particular marks an important watershed 
in the relationship between financial and non-financial firms, as well as the position of 
financial institutions in the network generally. Finally, external environment shifts, such as 
crises and emerging corporate codes related to non-executive directors, have resulted in 
important changes in connectivity behaviours throughout the period. 
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A number of network indicators can provide important insights into the changes outlined. 
Network density is one network feature that was significantly altered over this period, 
indicating changes in the nature of connectivity across the network, particularly as it relates to 
the highly connected and concentrated core of the network. Table 3 details the percentage of 
firms that were connected in each of the sample years, the percentage of firms which can be 
denoted as marginal (possessing only one or two links to the network) and the percentage 
which were isolated (had no tie to the network). Additionally, Table 4 details the number of 
total linkages in the network for each given year, with 1976 being the year with the most 
linkages and 1983 being the year with the fewest. Given that the percentage of firms 
connected to the network was lowest in 1976, but the number of links were the highest of all 
the benchmark years, this year shows a distinctly dense network overall, particularly at the 
network core. This feature is also clearly visible from the network diagram (see Figure 3). 
Through the benchmark years, the network grows significantly more dispersed, with the years 
following 1997 experiencing a distinct reduction in isolated firms, yet a consistently high 
number of marginal firms, again demonstrating the spread of the network and the reduction in 
network density overall.    
Table 3. Percentages of connected, marginal and isolated nodes 
Year 1976 1983 1993 1997 2000 2010 
% of 
connected 
firms 
75.6 80.9 80.4 90 87.2 91.9 
% of 
marginal 
firms 
21.6 29.76 26.69 25.2 35.2 24.8 
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% of 
isolated 
firms 
24.4 19.07 19.52 10 12.8 8.10 
Table 4. Number of linkages and Average Degree   
Year 1976 1983 1993 1997 2000 2010 
Number 
of total 
links 
542 370 455 519 424 487 
Average 
degree 
of entire 
network 
4.34 3.44 3.63 4.25 3.39 3.94 
Average 
degree 
of 
financial 
firms 
6.84 4.68 2.88 4.38 3.82 3.66 
 
The average degree indicator provides an average number of links for companies in each of 
the benchmark years. In the years that followed significant shifts in the British business 
landscape, one can observe a moderate reflective shift in the average degree. For instance, 
this is especially notable following the crisis years of the early 1970s (1976), the post-
Cadbury years (1997) and the global financial crisis (2010). However, if financial firms are 
isolated from the dataset, their average degree over the years reflects a slightly divergent 
pattern to the rest of the network for the early years. Up to the mid-1990s, financial 
institutions on average appear to be receding from the network at a more significant rate than 
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the network average. That said, financial firms also undergo a period of reintegration in 1997, 
but resume their pattern towards disintegration in the 2000s. This reflects the significant 
change in the position of financial firms overall in the network over the last sixty years, 
particularly away from their previously central position in the core of the network.  This 
becomes even more apparent when looking at the top twenty-five companies for each of the 
benchmark years discussed below.  
Table 5. Average distance between nodes 
Year 1976 1983 1993 1997 2000 2010 
Average 
Distance 
3.26 3.72 3.98 3.86 4.4 4.15 
 
Dispersion in the network over time can also be viewed through the average distance 
indicator that being the average number of links to move from one node to another in the 
network. In Table 5, one can detect a notable increase in the average network distance. Taken 
together with the data on average degree and number of links, this suggests a wider network, 
where connections between firms are more dispersed, firms are less isolated and there is a 
general absence of clique-like behaviour. Related to this, our most recent article highlights the 
presence of what we have referred to as ‘big-linkers’ in the first three quarters of the twentieth 
century. These were individuals, usually regarded as having a high social status, who 
possessed multiple board seats; the highest number being seven board seats in 1938 held by 
two individuals, Lord Essendon and J. B. A. Kessler. For the period under investigation in 
this article, one can observe in Figure 2 the distinct reduction in positions where over five 
board seats were held by one person. While an increase in the presence of those holding four 
board seats is apparent in the late 1990s, by 2010 this number was also significantly reduced.     
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Figure 2. Number of board seats held by ‘big linkers’, 1976-2010 
 
These network indicators demonstrate the significant transformation of the corporate network, 
particularly in the pre-1980s to post-1980s period. Given changes in the financial sector and 
expectations of boards of directors in the 1980s and 1990s, respectively, these indicators 
reveal the true impact of shifts in the British business landscape on board connectivity. The 
following discussion illustrates some of the major changes experienced by the corporate 
network over the benchmark years in conjunction with more general changes in the British 
business landscape. 
The Corporate Network, 1976-2010 
 
The dataset of inter-locking directorships reveals much about changing corporate 
connectivity in British business over the period 1976-2010. Our previous article highlighted a 
number of significant shifts in the pattern of inter-organisational relationships up to 1976 that 
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were visible through an analysis of the corporate network. The corporate network of both pre- 
and post-war years (1938 and 1958) demonstrated a highly centralised and embedded 
network, with a denser core to the network dominated by financial institutions. On the other 
hand, while these institutions remained well-connected at the centre of the network, the 
percentage of isolated or marginal firms was high (55%).55 The cartel-like financial clustering 
evident in the corporate network of 1958 illustrates the inward-looking business environment 
influenced by a domestic focus in business during this period.56 Driving much of this 
behaviour in the period leading up to 1976 were the restrictive lending practices put in place 
by the government and carried out through the Bank of England.57  In the following decades, 
this environment was in perpetual flux, influenced by financial crises, policy changes and 
changing patterns of ownership, all of which contributed to the rise of new financial players 
as advisors and intermediaries. In the 1960s and 1970s, as direct private investment declined 
and individuals began to invest their personal wealth through financial intermediaries, 
institutional investors became “the protector of the private shareholder”, the “supervisor of 
efficient resource allocation”, the “auditor of management efficiency”, and at times, simply 
an investment advisor.58 As companies searched for greater liquidity in the 1960s, the Stock 
Exchange and large financial investors and advisors were consequently of much greater 
importance.59 In this period leading up to the late-1970s, one can also view a shift in the 
practices of traditional financial institutions such as merchant banks which were expanding 
their role as investment advisors to British industry.60  
Another major influence on the network was the merger waves of the late-1950s and 
1960s that resulted in the amalgamation of a number of core British firms, both financial and 
non-financial. Linked to these changes was a significant shift in ownership of British equities, 
as outlined in Figure 1, with institutional investors increasing their share to 34.2%, the largest 
being insurance companies (12.2%), which at times acted on the behalf of pension funds.61 
Most notable amongst the changes in investment practices was the decline in private 
ownership of UK equity, fundamentally changing the landscape of British business. Changes 
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in the regulatory environment in the late-1960s and the secondary banking crisis of the early-
1970s signified the need to reassess the role and freedoms of financial institutions in the 
British economy.62 This period led to yet another shift in the British business landscape which 
impacted on the shape and connectivity of the corporate network in 1976 (Figure 3). In 1976, 
the network demonstrates growing integration of firms as the overall number of marginal or 
isolated firms declined significantly from previous years.63 In the core of the network (Table 
6), the presence of financial institutions other than commercial banks had increased, 
suggesting the growing importance of these institutions in British business during this period, 
perhaps as a result of their evolving role as advisors and investors.   
Figure 3. The British corporate network in 1976 
 
Table 6. Top 25 most central companies in 1976 (according to Freeman Degree) 
Company name Freeman Degree 
Lloyds Bank 28 
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Midland Bank 21 
British Petroleum 19 
National Westminster Bank 18 
Barclays Bank 18 
Commercial Union 18 
Finance For Industry  17 
Hill Samuel Group 16 
Delta Metal  16 
Tube Investments 15 
Imperial Chemical Industries 15 
Shell Transport & Trading 14 
Standard Chartered Bank 14 
Rank Organisation 14 
Eagle Star Insurance 14 
Royal Insurance 13 
Guardian Royal Exchange Insurance 13 
P & O Steam Navigation 12 
Lazard Brothers 11 
General Accident, Fire & Life Assurance 11 
Lucas Industries 11 
Dunlop Holdings 11 
British Leyland 10 
Fisons 10 
Hawker Siddeley Group 10 
 
The change in ownership patterns was widely known by the time of the Wilson 
Commission report of 1979, which highlighted the distinct move towards ownership of 
securities by financial institutions such as insurance companies and pension funds. This 
transfer of ownership arose out of a general preference for owning shares through financial 
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institutions such as unit and investment trusts, as well as a failure by the City to support 
private investors who had less wealth but were eager to invest in domestic corporations.64 At 
the same time, there is little evidence that the accumulation of equity by institutional investors 
either exerted any influence over merger activity or resulted in the formation of shareholder 
voting coalitions.65 
It is apparent from Figure 1 that institutional investors continued their strategy of 
investing in British business, given that by 1981 they owned over half of all listed UK 
equities (57.6%) and pension funds had overtaken insurance companies as the largest single 
category.66 A complicating factor in this scenario, however, was the 1980 Companies Act, 
which made it even more difficult for fund managers to access privileged company 
information, but also created a legal necessity for each to maintain a distant relationship.67 
Increased competition in the financial sector during the 1980s, brought on by de-
mutualisation and the extensive incursion of foreign banks, facilitated by the liberalisation of 
financial dealing, incited institutions to focus on new areas. Banks, for instance, turned their 
attention to international investments as the market for corporate finance became saturated 
with ‘other financials’ and new financial intermediaries.68 
This departure from traditional activities created even greater complexity within the financial 
sector, while it is also apparent from Table 7 that even before the ‘Big Bang’ of 1986 the 
nature of the intercorporate network was changing dramatically, most likely exacerbated by 
another intense merger wave. Indeed, one can see from Table 7 that by 1983 the average 
Freeman degree of the firms at the core of the network was much lower than it had been in 
previous years. This indicates that as many firms were decreasing the number of direct board 
links they possessed, the network as a whole was much less dense and the distances between 
firms was increasing, creating a much more dispersed network (see Figure 4). However, while 
the core of the network was noticeably less dense, the number of firms connected to the 
network increased to 81% (up from 75% in the previous benchmark year). This trend is linked 
to the rising number of marginal firms (with only one or two connections to the network) 
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which by 1983 made up 30% of the network overall. While financial firms were still at the 
core of the network and ‘other financials’ continued to increase their role as shareowners of 
non-financial companies, the network was far less concentrated than it had been in previous 
years (see Table 6). Above all, this can be linked to the shifting focus of financial institutions, 
creating greater dispersion amongst inter-sectoral links, which if we consider instances in 
which financial institutions were shareholders in British business and combine this with an 
evidenced preference for short-term results, suggests that the implementation of long-term 
relationships between boards and shareholders was no longer possible. The increased distance 
between financial and non-financial institutions could have been exacerbated by many firms 
turning their focus towards international investment activities, giving rise to the much greater 
frequency of ‘faceless’ interactions facilitated by the use of new technologies.   
Table 7. Top 25 most central companies (based on Freeman degree), 1983 
Company name Freeman Degree 
Lloyds Bank 20 
Barclays Bank 18 
Rio Tinto-Zinc Corporation 14 
Hill Samuel Group 13 
Midland Bank 13 
National Westminster Bank 13 
Sun Alliance & London Insurance 13 
'Shell' Transport & Trading 12 
Royal Insurance 12 
British Petroleum Co. 11 
Eagle Star Holdings 11 
Blue Circle Industries 10 
Imperial Chemical Industries 10 
Standard Chartered Bank 10 
Chloride Group 9 
London & Scottish Marine Oil 9 
Westland 9 
Allied-Lyons 8 
B. A. T. Industries 8 
Inchcape 8 
John Brown 8 
THORN EMI 8 
Kleinwort, Benson, Lonsdale 8 
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Legal & General Group 8 
Beecham Group 7 
 
Figure 4. The British corporate network in 1983 
 
Alongside these trends, intra-sector links involving financial institutions were changing. Non-
monetary financial institutions, while still connected to many of the big banks, were moving 
away from these financial players. For example, Hill Samuel Group and Eagle Star Holdings 
were connected mainly to industrial companies, apart from a small number of investment 
trusts and insurance companies. Although these financial institutions retained good inter-
sectoral links, with only a small group of firms (with a Freeman degree of less than two) 
favouring ties to other financials (only four retained no ties to the network), it is clear that the 
financial cartel of the 1950s had disappeared.69 Furthermore, the network was more dispersed, 
with ‘other financials’ diversifying their links more extensively in order to protect their 
investments. 
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While the growing concentration of ownership by financial institutions had the potential to 
allow for cohesive corporate coalitions and greater shareholder influence over corporate 
behaviour,70 the growing dispersion of the network potentially reflects the increasing 
disconnect between shareholders and boards, and that, despite the potential for greater 
communication between shareholders and boards, the expected power shift into the hands of 
investors did not occur71. Alongside the more obvious barriers such as dispersed share 
ownership and the associated problems of co-ordination, management and control; other 
problems such as free-riding, diversification, long chains of intermediation, rational apathy 
and informational deficit have also been highlighted as reasons for investor passivity.72   
Moreover, the deregulation of the London Stock Exchange in the mid-1980s provided foreign 
financial institutions with much greater access to the City of London, providing new cash 
flows for investment, both domestically and internationally.73 The clearing banks especially 
shifted the focus of their strategies from domestic to global markets, a point substantiated in 
Table 8, which highlights how the centrality of the clearing banks declined by 1993, while 
Figure 5 illustrates how the trend towards a dispersed network continued. Table 8 reveals that 
while Barclays retained the same degree centrality as in 1983, the number of financials at the 
core of the network was decreasing significantly (see Figure 5). This continued withdrawal of 
financial institutions from the network could be a representation of the lengthening 
investment chain that drew shareholders and boards further apart, effectively leaving senior 
executives in control of their respective companies.  
 
Figure 5. The British corporate network in 1993  
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Table 8.Top 25 most central companies (based on Freeman degree), 1993 
Company name Freeman Degree 
Barclays PLC 18 
Rio Tinto PLC 16 
Legal & General Group PLC 15 
De La Rue PLC 13 
Abbey National PLC 13 
Trafalgar House PLC 12 
Bank of Scotland PLC 12 
BAA Airports, Ltd. 11 
English China Clays PLC 11 
Lucas Varity PLC 11 
Unilever PLC 11 
HSBC Holdings PLC 11 
Standard Chartered PLC 11 
Imperial Chemical Industries PLC 10 
Smithkline Beecham PLC 10 
The BOC group LIMITED 10 
Lloyds Banking Group PLC 10 
AstraZeneca PLC 9 
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Rank Group PLC 9 
3I Group PLC 8 
Alliance Boots PLC 8 
BET PLC 8 
BP PLC 8 
Eurotunnel PLC 8 
Hanson, Ltd. 8 
 
In highlighting these characteristics of the 1990s corporate network, it is clear that the 
business environment was undergoing yet another change, given that by 1992 institutional 
investors owned 60.6% of UK equities. Furthermore, financial institutions had significantly 
decreased their presence at the core of the network, which could reflect the growing distance 
between executives and owners as shareholder roles were increasingly occupied by portfolio 
investors both in the UK and abroad.74 It can therefore be hypothesised that the 1980s 
changes in corporate strategy and structure, such as increased divestment of subsidiaries by 
multidivisional corporations, shifting patterns of ownership and an emerging era of corporate 
governance codes, all played a role in changing both the shape and connectivity of the 
corporate network.75 Regardless of this renewed focus on corporate governance, however, the 
largest owners of industrial concerns continued their detachment from the network, which in 
1993 contained the greatest number of ‘other financials’ with no ties to other firms. It is clear 
from the network data that while the level of integration versus dispersion was much the same 
as in 1983, when financial institutions’ ties are examined, they reveal much greater change. 
The syndicated nature of finance seen in the 1950s-1960s was clearly at an end for banks, 
which possessed far more links to industrial firms and were often only linked to one other 
financial, a trend carried on from 1983. While this could suggest a positive inter-sectoral 
relationship, it is clear from past decades that intra-sectoral connections provided much 
needed support and monitoring amongst the financial sector. That said, many boards of 
financial institutions other than banks with connections to fewer than three other boards 
maintained only intra-sectoral ties, a dispersion trend that is illustrated in Figures 5 and 6. 
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Figure 6. The British corporate network in 1997  
 
 
Table 9.Top 25 most central companies (based on Freeman degree), 1997  
Company name  Freeman Degree 
National Westminster Bank PLC 14 
Marks & Spencer Group PLC 14 
M (2003) PLC 13 
British Airways PLC 13 
HSBC Holdings PLC 13 
Barclays PLC 12 
Standard Chartered PLC 12 
Intercontinental Hotels Group PLC 12 
Bank of Scotland PLC 11 
Diageo PLC 11 
Alliance Boots PLC 11 
Reuters Group PLC 11 
Uniq PLC 11 
Inchcape PLC 11 
Rio Tinto PLC 11 
Rank Group PLC 10 
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BP PLC 10 
BT Group PLC 10 
Tesco PLC 9 
EMI Group, Ltd. 9 
Unilever PLC 9 
RSA Insurance Group PLC 9 
Prudential PLC 9 
Abbey National PLC 9 
Imperial Tobacco Group PLC 9 
 
Influenced by numerous corporate scandals,76 stock market manipulations and the behaviour 
of directors in some large corporations, a series of reports and committees advocated the need 
for a closer relationship between executives and owners.77 An interesting change in the 
network between 1993 and 1997 reflects an important response towards these recurrent 
corporate governance issues and policy changes. The most noticeable of these was the 1992 
Cadbury Report, which urged boards to ensure greater accountability to shareholders in order 
to fulfil their fiduciary duty and ensure shareholders could exert control over their investee 
companies.78 The Cadbury Code also sought to define more clearly the roles and 
responsibilities of non-executive directors as monitors of corporate behaviour, exerting a 
general need for a greater presence of such non-executive directors on company boards.79 
Conyon and Mallin found that there had been substantial compliance to the Cadbury Code by 
the late-1990s,80 a trend further illustrated by the reduced density of the UK corporate 
network (see Figure 6). The network in 1997 reached a high level of integration (significantly 
higher than in the previous benchmark years), with 90% of all firms retaining a tie to the 
network, suggesting that the practice of inter-locking through outside directors was more 
prevalent across the network and not a just a practice undertaken by a few key firms and 
individuals. While the number of marginal firms still occupied a large category (25% of 
firms), the number of completely isolated firms was dramatically lower. The number of total 
links in the network was also at its highest, but dispersed amongst the network, creating 
greater distance in the network and a less dense core, yet overall more integration.  
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In terms of the financial sector, while bank ties in this year retain much the same 
composition as in 1993, changes to financial institutions other than banks were more 
pronounced. The impact of changes in policy on the position of ‘other financials’ was such 
that by 1997 the number of these firms with no tie to the network had fallen to just three. 
While the network itself was widening and less concentrated at its core, meaning more 
companies were linked to the network but fewer companies possessed multiple board 
connections, it is clear that there was a concerted effort amongst many financial institutions to 
re-integrate themselves into the network and increase their ties to non-financial firms. For 
example, Manchester & London Assurance group, which in 1993 had no links to the network, 
by 1997 had five, most of which were non-financials (other than Segro PLC). Schroders, an 
important asset management and advisory firm, also increased its links within the network 
from three to five. Additionally, by 1997 Prudential PLC, whose investment arm, Prudential 
Portfolio Managers Ltd., had been the second largest manager of UK equities in 1991, was 
linked only to industrial concerns. Large fund managers of the 1990s such as M & G group 
and Sun Life, neither of which appeared in the 1993 network, were well integrated by 1997. 
The growth and consolidation of firms such as M & G group was indicative of a move toward 
a re-concentration of ownership. This strongly suggests that the poor corporate behaviour of 
the 1980s and the growing detachment of shareholders from their investee company boards 
had provoked both corporate governance reforms and some decisive movements within the 
network by 1997, even if the former were undertaken largely in the interest of protecting 
shareholders and little mention of changes to boardroom behaviour and general business 
ethics was made.81 
Over the course of the next decade, the financial sector continued to grow more 
complex. Although the network appeared to respond positively to policy shifts in 1997 
through greater integration, by 2000 the network was becoming increasingly dispersed, with a 
greater number of firms wholly disconnected (albeit not to the degree reached in 1976, 1983 
and 1993, the years when the percentage of isolated firms was highest). One possible 
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explanation of the increased network dispersion in 2000 could be the emphasis on director 
independence within the developing UK Corporate Governance Code.82 In this year, nearly 
half of all firms are either marginal or isolated, suggesting in some cases a growing distance 
between boards, perhaps exacerbated by growing distance between owners and investee 
companies. Although the concentration of ownership in the hands of British financial 
institutions decreased from the mid-1990s and share-ownership generally became more 
dispersed amongst both domestic and international investors, this era witnessed a burgeoning 
of financial intermediaries and the lengthening of an investment chain that was already 
attenuated.83 These developments served to weaken even further the link between investors 
and their portfolio companies,84 even though building on what the Cadbury Code first 
introduced, the Higgs Review (2003) highlighted the growing significance of the non-
executive director role in corporate governance.85  Regardless of this change, however, the 
corporate network trends of the 1990s continued into the 2000s. In particular, it is apparent 
that the network widened over this period (see Figure 7), with a significant decrease in the 
number of links between firms, albeit not returning to pre-Cadbury levels in terms of 
disconnection.  
Figure 7. The British corporate network in 2000. 
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It is first of all apparent from Table10 (see also Figure 7) that financial institutions in 
the network had moved even further away from the core. A second characteristic of the 
network in 2000 was its compartmentalised nature, with a greater number of clusters 
emerging that were set apart from the larger network, as well as firms connected through a 
chain of singular, rather than multiple, integrated links. This was significant in that companies 
had fewer lines of communication within the network, thereby reducing both the extent of 
interaction between boards and the level of integration. Indeed, the average distance between 
firms continued to increase; despite more firms being connected, the path from one firm to the 
next was on average longer.86 This reflected the complicated inter-organizational relationships 
emerging in this decade, a scenario precipitated by a combination of new governance codes 
and the increased complexity of the financial sector. By 2000, non-monetary financial 
institutions had all but disappeared from the Top 25 most central companies (see Table 10), 
potentially illustrating the continued dispersion of share ownership amongst financial 
institutions, individuals and foreign investors. Beneficial ownership of UK equity by 
institutional investors had fallen to just under 50% by 1998, a trend that continued into the 
twenty-first century.87 The decrease in the average degree centrality of the network and the 
withdrawal of financial institutions from the core of the network meant that for the first time 
in the dataset, three non-financial companies occupied the position of most central in the 
corporate network (see Table 10). While banks continued to be well-connected in the 
network, their centrality had also been reduced significantly by the 2000s, illustrating once 
again a decline in the influence they could potentially have exerted over corporate strategy.  
Table 10. Top 25 most central companies (based on Freeman degree), 2000 
Company name Freeman Degree 
British Airways PLC 15 
Invensys PLC 14 
BT Group PLC 12 
Lloyds Banking Group PLC 12 
Cable & Wireless Communications PLC 11 
Rio Tinto PLC 11 
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Rolls-Royce Holdings PLC 11 
ALLIANCE BOOTS PLC 11 
Barclays PLC 11 
Standard Chartered PLC 11 
BP PLC 10 
Glaxosmithkline PLC 9 
REUTERS GROUP PLC 9 
HSBC Holdings PLC 9 
Bank of Scotland PLC 9 
M (2003) PLC 8 
Marks & Spencer Group PLC 8 
Trinity Mirror PLC 8 
Rank Group PLC 8 
NOVAR PLC 8 
Royal Bank Of Scotland Group PLC 8 
Prudential PLC 8 
Anglo American PLC 7 
Tesco PLC 7 
Compass Group PLC 7 
 
One of the more powerful explanations for these trends was that despite a continued focus on 
corporate governance issues by a succession of committees, introducing stricter governance 
guidelines on corporate monitoring that had the potential to impact on the frequency of 
outside directors on corporate boards, other factors such as increasing global integration and 
riskier financial activity caused the network to be drawn apart once again.88 As a result of 
these developments, the concentration of ownership declined, suggesting that developments 
in corporate governance policy and the financial landscape in general continued to influence 
the nature of ownership in British business.89 Even though financial institutions continued to 
be significant owners of British business, their withdrawal from the corporate network serves 
to corroborate the empirical evidence that shareholders in the twenty-first century continued 
to exert limited influence over their portfolio companies. This characteristic was further 
exacerbated by the enormous influx of foreign investors (“Rest of World” in Figure 2) from 
the 1990s. Crucially, executives remained largely in control of decision-making and strategy, 
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while investors continued their arms-length approach, operating mainly through an array of 
intermediaries who prioritised short-term returns on investments  
Despite fluctuating dispersion in network connections through the late-1990s and 
early-2000s, the global financial crisis of 2007-08 caused yet another dramatic shift in the 
corporate network. As Figure 8 and Table 11 reveal, by 2010 there had been a re-integration 
of the network as a whole. In this year, the network reached the highest percentage of 
integrated firms overall in all benchmark years, along with a low number of marginal firms 
and an even lower number of isolated firms (only 8.1% of all firms). The number of total ties 
between firms also increased, indicating an increased density in the network overall. 
Although banks appear to be continually losing their networked position in this period, the 
activity of banks such as Barclays and Lloyds suggests a move towards greater intra-sectoral 
links, perhaps motivated by a need to protect the banks that remained active after the crisis. 
On the other hand, the position of financials as the most central companies in the network 
continued to decline in the 2000s (see Table 2). For banks especially, the crisis had a 
detrimental effect on their position in the network: while the percentage of UK equity 
ownership by banks had been increasing, reaching an all-time peak of 3.5 % in 2008,90 by 
2010 this had fallen to 2.5%, largely as a result of changes to banks’ investment activities in 
the wake of the crisis.91 For example, RBS sold off its stake in Direct Line, and similarly 
Lloyds sold off part of its stake in St. James Place, significantly reducing the bank’s 
investment activity in Britain. The position of other financial institutions also changed in this 
period, as a number of them returned to the core of the network. For example, firms such as 
Segro and RSA insurance joined the Top 25 most central companies, while Prudential 
retained its degree centrality with a Freeman degree of 8. This trend can be partially explained 
by the increased emphasis on environment, social and governance factors, as well as 
corporate social responsibility,92 and a move towards responsible investing that was 
articulated through an increase in corporate connectivity. This lead to greater corporate 
monitoring within the network as part of an immediate reaction to crisis, similar to that which 
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was seen in 1976. With foreign investors accounting for a much-increased proportion of UK 
equities – “Rest of the World” in Figure 2 rose from 3.6% in 1981 to 24% in 1997, reaching 
41.2% in 2010 - this displaced much of the share-ownership by UK financial institutions 
which by 2010 had fallen to 38.5 % (excluding banks).93  
Figure 8. The British corporate network in 2010 
 
Table 11. Top 25 most central companies (based on Freeman degree), 2010 
Company name Freeman Degree 
National Grid PLC 14 
WM Morrison Supermarkets PLC 11 
Tesco PLC 11 
J Sainsbury PLC 11 
BP PLC 11 
Standard Chartered PLC 11 
Royal Bank of Scotland Group PLC (the) 11 
Experian PLC 10 
Rolls-Royce Holdings PLC 10 
Reckitt Benckiser Group PLC 9 
BAE Systems PLC 9 
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Anglo American PLC 9 
Reed Elsevier PLC 8 
Unite Group PLC (the) 8 
IMI PLC 8 
DS Smith PLC 8 
Halfords Group PLC 8 
Segro PLC 8 
Johnson Matthey PLC 8 
Home Retail Group PLC 8 
Vodafone Group PLC 8 
RSA Insurance Group PLC 8 
Prudential PLC 8 
Intertek Group PLC 7 
Arm Holdings PLC    7 
 
The increased level of foreign investment in British corporations has had an astounding effect 
on corporate connectivity. With the influx of foreign investor companies, most of which were 
institutional investors, interlocks as a method of corporate monitoring within the corporate 
network became even more difficult. Similarly, the increased emphasis on board 
independence originating with the 1992 Cadbury Code was further developed through various 
iterations of the Combined Code of Corporate Governance introduced in 2003. This, together 
with the increased internationalisation of business and a decrease in clique-like behaviour 
amongst a group of well-connected directors that was visible in earlier benchmark years 
reduced the propensity to build corporate networks through board interlocks. Coupled with a 
standardized reduction in board size from the 1990s, it became even more difficult for British 
financial institutions to influence corporate decision-making through board representation. 
The close-knit corporate network of the 1950s, although less monitored than in recent 
decades, possessed open lines of communication between boards, giving investors and 
outside stakeholders the opportunity to influence company strategy and performance. The 
decline in intra-sectoral links prevalent in the financial sector before the 1990s also indicated 
an important shift away from the ‘self-regulatory’ environment which perhaps at times 
provided much needed support, monitoring and advice to financial and non-financial 
institutions. What Scott and Griff described as the ‘financial control’ of British business in the 
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1980s was never realised in later decades.94 The absence of a shift in power into the hands of 
institutional investors, despite the concentration of ownership by financial institutions up to 
the 1990s, meant that boards and executives were left to run companies, while institutions 
merely waited for returns on their investments. Into the twenty-first century, the continued 
control by executives was further demonstrated through the activity and decisions of 
remuneration committees.95  
The withdrawal of financial institutions from the network and the overall decline in 
corporate connectivity in recent decades suggests a number of interesting trends related to the 
degree of communication within and between sectors.96 The dispersed structure of the current 
network of interlocks seen in Figure 7 and the involvement of a greater number of foreign 
owners has significant ramifications for the structure and board-level activity of British firms, 
especially as it pertains to instances in which financial institutions represent shareholder 
interests. However, it is questionable whether this marks the beginning of a re-integration of 
certain types of financial institutions into the core of the network, indicative of the beginnings 
of a reinstitution of financial control over British boards, or simply a temporary reaction to 
new codes of practice and the aftershocks of a global financial crisis. One might note, though, 
that such were the conclusions of The Kay review (2012), the Ownership Commission 
(2012), as well as the most recent study into the effectiveness of the UK asset management 
industry by the UK Financial Conduct Authority (2016) relating to the deep level of 
disengagement by institutional investors and their continued preference for high-frequency 
trading, that little would change.  
 
Conclusions and implications for further research 
 
While our previous article on finance-industry relationships on the earlier part of the 
twentieth century demonstrated shifts in bank amalgamations, connectivity and inter-sectoral 
ties, this extension of the corporate network analysis further articulates the continual 
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transformations to the British financial sector and indeed the British business landscape as a 
whole up to 2010. Using an original and comprehensive dataset on the directors of the Top 
250 British companies over the period 1976-2010, it has been possible to generate both 
revised views of the UK’s corporate network and contribute to emergent literatures relating to 
the evolution of corporate governance in the UK, changes within the British financial sector 
and developments within finance-industry relationships in the last few decades. This article 
has also provided a fresh perspective for viewing wider trends and has elaborated on the work 
of John Scott and Paul Windolf by stretching such methods into the late twentieth and early 
twenty-first centuries.97 In particular, we identify a distinct change in the role of British 
financial institutions in British business in recent decades. This suggests a number of 
interesting conclusions: given the increasing role of financial institutions in UK equity 
ownership from 1960, the withdrawal of financial institutions from the network suggests a 
growing disconnect between owners and boards, a feature which can only be fully appreciated 
through visualising the corporate network. Additionally, major changes in the business 
landscape related to policy and crises appear to have resonated in the network itself, 
demonstrating reactive corporate interlocking behaviour amongst the largest businesses in 
Great Britain. 
Although space limitations prevent us from indulging in a comparative analysis of corporate 
networks across developed economies, it is useful to link the work on the British scene with 
the detailed research collected together by David and Westerhuis.98 It is especially noticeable 
that just as in the UK, corporate networks were eroded from the 1980s, largely as a result of 
both tighter regulation and the nature and impact of globalisation, especially when linked to 
the liberalisation of financial markets. Of course, the comparative perspective is much more 
nuanced, but the reduction in board size and declining presence of ‘big linkers’ would also 
appear to have been significant trends across many economies. These extremely valuable 
insights reinforce our claim that much more detailed research into domestic and international 
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corporate networks would provide further depth to the analysis of what in the last 150 years 
have been consistent features of the business scene. 
Returning to the British case, apart from what recent developments in the corporate 
network suggest about the current state of British inter-corporate relationships, we can 
reiterate the three observations offered at the start of this article. Firstly, it is apparent from 
our research that by the 2000s British corporate networks were much less dense than they had 
been up to the 1980s. Secondly, this highlights the different stages through which UK 
corporate networks evolved between 1976 and 2010. While up to the 1980s financial 
institutions were acquiring a significant number of corporate board directorships in both 
financial and non-financial firms, thereafter they withdrew from the corporate network. This 
trend could be explained by a combination of extended corporate governance regulations that 
imposed tighter controls on cross-company interaction and reduced board size, alongside the 
pursuit of global strategies that took financial institutions away from the previous preference 
for British shareholdings.  Thirdly, the 1980s marked a decisive watershed in the relationship 
between financial and other sectors, radically altering the perception of UK corporate 
networks that had been generated up to that decade.  
Above all, this research presents a novel perspective on changing relationships 
between Britain’s largest companies over the last half-century, one that confirms the periodic 
transformational nature of corporate activity in Britain through distinct shifts in the structure 
and composition of corporate connectivity, a trend identified by Hannah regarding British 
business in the first half of the twentieth century.99 While much more work needs to be done 
on the relationship between corporate connectivity and power potential, it is apparent that by 
using the corporate network lens one can evaluate the effectiveness of policy and varied 
regulatory environments, as well as responses to crucial external shifts in the economy and 
wider corporate strategy.100 At the same time, it is worth adding that much greater research is 
required at a micro- case-study level in order to comprehend fully the relationship between 
boards, and especially as it relates to investors and managers, providing a challenge that will 
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result in an improved understanding of the dynamics of British business over this period. By 
building a foundation on which one can identify major shifts, industry anomalies and the 
changing networked position of particular categories of firms, this study has highlighted 
important perspectives that warrant further investigation. For instance, the changing position 
of financials suggests that changes in foreign ownership and increasing global financial 
connectivity has had a direct impact on corporate connectivity in British business, illustrating 
how the network can be utilised to identify firms influenced by such shifts. Finally, the move 
towards reintegration seen in both 1976 and again in 2010 suggests a wider response to crises 
that can only be fully appreciated through visualising the corporate network.  
Further research into the impact of crises on the corporate network and interlocking 
behaviour would also reveal much regarding inter-organisational relationship strategies, 
especially if this was more extensively linked to the comparative work of David and 
Westerhuis. While the authors acknowledge the limitations of the study, in so far as one can 
observe the changing patterns of interlocks over a significant period of British business, but 
not necessarily the impact of individual links between firms in the network, this study lays 
important foundations for recognising potentially significant relationships within and between 
industries, as well as individual firms. This research can also suggest some interesting 
hypotheses that might be more fully realised through micro-level research, especially as it 
pertains to the continuing disconnect between company boards. Through the corporate 
governance literature and now the revealed dispersion of financial institutions within the 
corporate network itself, one can find little evidence to support the claim that “New Financial 
Capitalism” had come to dominate British business. While one can accept that decision-
making on boards of directors is still predicated on shareholder primacy, or “financialization” 
strategies, those who owned the bulk of UK equities failed to engage much in the 
determination of generic corporate strategy, allowing senior executives to continue to 
dominate decision-making and determine their remuneration packages. This study provides 
significant conclusions about macro-trends in corporate connectivity since the 1970s, as well 
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as providing direction for future research by highlighting potential case studies within a wider 
context, revealing further intricate detail regarding changes to the British business landscape.  
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